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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Kristina Quintana appealed in two separate cases in which the district court had
imposed sentences based on the same presentence information. Primarily, she argues
that the district court in case number 39156 did not actually consider the mental health
evaluations performed on her, but instead, disregarded the diagnoses provided in the
evaluations, made its own determination as to Ms. Quintana's mental health status, and
in so doing, failed to meet its statutory obligation from I.C. § 19-2523. Additionally, she
contends that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny her motion to augment the
appellate record with the presentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI) prepared
for her co-defendant, Shauntel King, which the district court expressly considered in
case number 39156, it denied her state and federal constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection. 1
The State's defense of the district court's actions regarding Ms. Quintana's
mental illnesses is based on the theory that, by rejecting those evaluations and
substituting its own determination of Ms. Quintana's mental state for that of trained
professionals, the district court fulfilled its statutory obligation to "consider" her mental
illnesses.

However, that position would make I.C. § 19-2522, which requires the

appointment of a trained medical professional to perform the evaluation, superfluous.
And, in regard to the constitutional violations, the State argues that an outline of part of

Ms. Quintana also made arguments regarding the abuses of discretion regarding her
sentences and Rule 35 motions, to which the State did not provide remarkable
responses. As such, Ms. Quintana simply refers the Court to her Appellant's Brief on
those issues, as indicated infra.
1

1

the co-defendant's PSI, reproduced in Ms. Quintana's PSI, was sufficient, rather than
providing the whole document, as required by precedent. Neither of these responses
reflects the state of the law, and as such, this Court should remedy those errors.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Quintana's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

The same citations used in the

Appellant's Brief are used in this Reply Brief. (See App. Br., p.2, n.2; p.3, n.3.)

2

ISSUES
1. Whether the district court in case number 39156 abused its discretion when it
imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty years, with eight years fixed, upon
Ms. Quintana following her plea of guilty to burglary and grand theft by
possession of stolen property.
2. Whether the district court in case number 39156 abused its discretion when it
denied Ms. Quintana's Rule 35 motion in light of the new evidence she
presented.
3. Whether the district court in case number 39049 abused its discretion when it
imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with three years fixed, upon
Ms. Quintana following her plea of guilty to grand theft.
4. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Ms. Quintana due process and equal
protection when it denied her Motion to Augment with Ms. King's PSI in light of
the district court's express consideration of that information.

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court In Case Number 39156 Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed
An Aggregate Sentence Of Twenty Years, With Eight Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Quintana
Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Burglary And Grand Theft By Possession Of
Stolen Property

A.

Introduction
There is a significant distinction between simply talking about the results of a

mental health evaluation and actually giving careful consideration to those results. As
Ms. Quintana's mental condition was going to be a significant issue at sentencing, the
district court was required to consider the results of the mental health evaluation that
was performed on Ms. Quintana.

It did not do so.

Rather, the district court merely

mentioned them as it dismissed them, and then the district court substituted its own
determination in their place.

As the Legislature made clear in I.C. §§ 19-2522 and

19-2523, it is not the place of the district court to reevaluate the defendant; that is the
reason why the statutes require the district court to appoint a trained professional to
perform the evaluation and to consider the evidence presented in the evaluations of that
trained professional.
Nevertheless, the State contends that the fact that the district court talked about
those results should be sufficient to fulfill the district court's statutory obligation. That
interpretation of the statute is erroneous and would make I.C. § 19-2522 superfluous.
As such, that interpretation should be rejected, along with the district court's improper
and insufficient discussion of the results of the mental health evaluations in this case.
That failure to properly consider the results of the mental health evaluation should, by

4

itself, be reason enough to vacate the imposed sentence and remand this case for a
new sentencing hearing.

B.

The District Court In Case Number 39156 Did Not Sufficiently Consider
Ms. Quintana's Diagnosed Mental Health Issues
Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the district court to consider the defendant's

mental illness as a sentencing factor where that condition is likely going to be a
significant factor at sentencing. 2

Holfon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).

The

statute's use of the mandatory language "shall" means that the district court is without
authority to disregard that factor or the evidence thereof.

See id.; Twin Falls

County v. Idaho Gom'n on Redistricting, 152 Idaho 346, 350-51 (2012) (holding that,
where a statute uses the mandatory language "must" or "shall," the actor is obligated to
follow the terms of that statute). The State contends that the district court fulfilled this
obligation.

(Resp. Br., p.14.)

It did not.

While the district court did talk about the

evaluations, it did not "consider" them in the manner required by statute:
(1) Evidence of mental condition shall be received, if offered, at the time of
sentencing of any person convicted of a crime. In determining the
sentence to be imposed in addition to other criteria provided by law, if the
defendant's mental condition is a significant factor, the court shall consider
such factors as:
(a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill;
(b) The degree of illness or defect and level of functional
impairment;
(c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation;

2 The record indicates that this was likely going to be a significant factor at sentencing.
(See, e.g., R., p.89 (Ms. Qunitana's answer on the plea advisory form indicating that
she suffers from two diagnosed mental health disorders for which she takes prescription
medications).)
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(d) The availability of treatment and level of care required;
(e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the
public, if at large, or the absence of such risk;

(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
at the time of the offense charged.
(2) The court shall authorize treatment during the period of confinement or
probation specified in the sentence if, after the sentencing hearing, it
concludes by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) The defendant suffers from a severe and reliably diagnosable
mental illness or defect resulting in the defendant's inability to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law;
(b) Without treatment, the immediate prognosis is for major distress
resulting in serious mental or physical deterioration of the
defendant;
(c) Treatment is available for such illness or defect;
(d) The relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment are
such that a reasonable person would consent to treatment. (of the
offense charged.)
(3) In addition to the authorization of treatment, the court shall pronounce
sentence as provided by law.

I.e. § 19-2523. Furthermore, I.e. § 19-2522 mandates that the district court "appoint at
least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the
mental condition of the defendant." I.e. §19-2522(1). Presumably, the district court is
not qualified to make these determinations, or else there would be no purpose for this
statute. The report that trained professional files must include:
(a) A description of the nature of the examination;
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of the
defendant;
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(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect and level
of functional impairment;
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the defendant's
mental condition;
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or
nontreatment;
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may create
for the public if at large.
I.C. § 19-2522(2).

These statutes reveal that the district court does not have the

authority or discretion to re-diagnose or to dismiss the diagnosis of the trained
professional who performed the evaluation.

See I.C. §§ 19-2522, 19-2523.

It is

restricted to considering only the degree to which the defendant is mentally ill
(I.C. § 19-2523(1 )(a)), a determination which must be made by the appointed evaluator
(I.C. §19-2522(2)(c)). Furthermore, the evidence which must be submitted and which
must be given consideration includes the risk of nontreatment.

I.C. §19-2522(e)-(f);

I.C. § 19-2523(1), (2)(b)-(d).
Nevertheless, the district court in case number 39156 expressly dismissed and
disregarded the findings of the appointed evaluator. First, it criticized the way in which
the appointed evaluator performed the evaluation:

"I'd just note that most of the

assessments that she -- that we had here, they don't really do the in-depth testing that
you would when you have a full psychological evaluation." (39156 Tr., p.38, L.22 - p.39,
L.2.) However, as long as the evaluator's report contains the information required by
I.C. § 19-2522(2), it is a sufficient evaluation upon which the district court is required to
rely. I.C. §19-2523(1) ("Evidence of mental condition shall be received, if offered ... ").
The district court also disparaged the evaluator's diagnosis:
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"I would say half the

population at this point is bi-polar, so .... " (39156 Tr., p.35, Ls.2-4.) There was no
evidence presented that showed bipolar disorder is not a significant mental illness
(which it is, regardless of how many people suffer from it).3 (See generally 39156 R.)
Therefore, the district court's finding in that regard is not supported by any evidence
(much less substantial or competent evidence) in the record, and it is clearly erroneous
and should be set aside. See, e.g., State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655,659 (2007).
Furthermore, the district court's analysis fails to fulfill the statutory obligation
to consider the evidence of the degree of impact Ms. Quintana's condition has on
her. I.C. § 19-2522(2)(c).

To that end, the district court is obligated under Idaho's

individualized sentencing structure to consider "the character and needs of the
individual [defendant] and the requirements of the community" in regard to that
particular defendant. See, e.g., State v. Seifart, 100 Idaho 321, 324 (1979). Comparing
the defendant's character to other offenders or potential offenders is not part of that
sentencing scheme. See, e.g., State v. Cambron, 118 Idaho 624, 626 (Ct. App. 1990).
Yet, the district court did exactly that, comparing Ms. Quintana's character and condition
to others and so failed to meet its statutory obligation to consider Ms. Quintana's
character by engaging in comparative considerations when imposing her sentence.
The district court also tried to justify its decision to disregard the evaluation's
findings by stating (again, without support in the record) that "the prison will do

Bipolar disorder type I is the more severe variety of bipolar disorder, in which mood
swings between mania and depression constitute drastic variations from normal
behavior. National Institute of Mental Health, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services,
"Bipolar Disorder," pp.4-5 (2008), http://mentalhealth.gov/health/publications/bipolardisorder/nimh-bipolar-adults.pdf. These episodes are more drastic and longer in
duration than those experienced in patients with bipolar disorder type II. Id. They
may also lead to the need for immediate hospitalization. Id.
3
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additional testing. The prison never even reviews any of the mental health records that
are provided in the presentence report." (39156 Tr., p.46, Ls.15-19.) Whether or not
the prison considers those evaluations does not impact the district court's obligations. It
still must consider the results from those evaluations and how they impact the
sentencing decision, particularly as to the risks of nontreatment. I.C. § 19-2523(1)-(2).
By disregarding the evaluation, the district court could not have considered the risks of
treatment and nontreatment, as required by statute, since it was unwilling to consider
the need for treatment at all. In fact, the cases on appeal demonstrate exactly what a
proper and an improper consideration of these factors looks like. (See App. Br., p.15
(comparing the district court's "consideration' of those factors, based on exactly the
same reports and evaluations, in case number 39049 with the improper consideration
(i.e., discussion and rejection) of that evidence in case number 39156).)

Additionally, if these comments by the district court are sufficient to fulfill its
statutory obligation to "consider" those evaluations, then I.C. § 19-2522 is deprived of
meaning.

In this case, the district court made its own, independent determination of

whether Ms. Quintana was suffering from a mental illness: "[t]his is not a mental health
issue.

This is someone trying to avoid consequences. . . . you don't tell [the

psychological evaluators] the full extent of your criminal activity prior to this. And so as
a result, they -- they decide that what this was instead was bipolar disorder." (Tr., p.45,
L.22 - p.46, L.14.) As such, if the district court is allowed to disregard the diagnosis of
the psychological evaluator, there is no reason for the psychological evaluator to be
appointed. Therefore, accepting the State's defense of the district court's actions in this
case would make I.C. §19-2522 superfluous, a result which is not permitted under Idaho
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law.

See, e.g., Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 897 (2011)

(quoting In re Winton Lumber Co., 57 Idaho 131, 136 (1936): "'effect must be given to
all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or
redundant''').
The district court in case number 39156 clearly failed to meet its statutory
obligation to consider the evidence offered in regard to Ms. Quintana's mental illness. It
did not actually consider the results of the evaluations submitted pursuant to I.C. § 192522, as it was required to do by I.C. § 19-2523. Instead, it dismissed those results and
substituted its own determination of whether Ms. Quintana was suffering from a mental
condition. Therefore, the district court in case number 39156 failed to fulfill its statutory
obligation, and thus, the resulting excessive sentence should be vacated and this case
remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 4

II.
The District Court In Case Number 39156 Abused Its Discretion When It Denied
Ms. Quintana's Rule 35 Motion In Light Of The New Evidence She Presented
The State's response in regard to this argument is not remarkable, and as such,
no further reply is necessary in regard to this issue. Accordingly, Ms. Qunitana simply
refers the Court back to pages 21-23 of her Appellant's Brief.

The State's response in regard to the district court's failure to sufficiently consider
other mitigating factors besides Ms. Quintana's mental illness is not remarkable, and as
such, no further reply is necessary in that regard. Accordingly, Ms. Quintana simply
refers the Court back to pages 16-21 of her Appellant's Brief.
4
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III.

The District Court In Case Number 39049 Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A
Unified Sentence Of Fourteen Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Quintana
Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Grand Theft
The State's response in regard to this argument is not remarkable, and as such,
no further reply is necessary in regard to this issue. Accordingly, Ms. Qunitana simply
refers the Court back to page 24 of her Appellant's Brief.

IV.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Quintana Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied Her Motion To Augment With Ms. King's PSI In Light Of The District
Court's Express Consideration Of That PSI

A.

Introduction
The State makes two responses in regard to the Idaho Supreme Court's violation

of Ms. Quintana's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection when it
denied her motion to augment with Ms. King's PSI, even though it was considered by
the district court in aggravation (i.e., the district court considered Ms. King to be an
additional victim of Ms. Quintana's actions instead of a co-defendant or even the driving
force behind their actions).

First, it argues that relief would not be available if the

case is assigned to the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals could simply
recognize the violation without overturning the Supreme Court's decision and grant
Ms. Quintana relief because her rights were violated. Otherwise, the Supreme Court
could retain this case and rectify its error.

Further, the fact that Ms. King's PSI was

considered by the district court and used as aggravation demonstrates the prejudice
caused by withholding it on appeal.

11

Second, the State contends that, an outline of one part of Ms. King's PSI was
reproduced in Ms. Quintana's PSI rectified any harm done.

However, the quoted

language is not a reproduction of Ms. King's PSI, but rather, as Ms. Qunitana's PSI
states, an outline summary of the relationship between Ms. King and Ms. Quintana.
Second, even if a portion of that document were a complete excerpt of Ms. King's PSI,
the district court stated that it considered the entire document, not just an excerpt.
Therefore, the excerpt would not rectify the violatoin because Ms. Quintana would still
be deprived of information the district court considered in aggravation, as there is no
indication that was the only portion of Ms. King's PSI considered by the district court in
that regard.
As such, Ms. Quintana's rights were violated, there is no remedy, whole or
partial, in the record, and either appellate court is capable of providing a remedy for
those violations.

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Deprived Ms. Quintana Of Her Constitutional Rights
To Due Process And Equal ProtectionS
The State does not contend that the deprivation of evidence considered by the

district court in aggravation would not constitute a violation of Ms. Quintana's
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.

(See generally Resp.

Br., pp.18-24.) Rather, it only contends that she failed to show that the district court

S Ms. Quintana also argued that the decision to not augment the record on appeal with
Ms. King's PSI could deprive her of her constitutional right to effective assistance of
appellate counsel. As the State did not provide any argument in response to that claim,
no reply is necessary and Ms. Quintana simply refers this Court to pages 27-28 of her
Appellant's Brief.
12

relied on the absent information and that the absent information was not sufficiently
reproduced in Ms. Quintana's PSI. 6 (See Resp. Br., pp.18-24.)
As to the State's argument that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny
Ms. Quintana's request for access to Ms. King's PSI did not deprive Ms. Qunitana of a
sufficient record (see Resp. Br., p.20-22) is disingenuous and explicitly disproved by the
record.

The record is very clear that the district court relied on Ms. King's PSI:

"[HJaving read Miss King's presentence report and seeing the interaction, I consider
Miss King a victim of Miss Quintana." (39156 Tr., pAD, LS.6-9 (emphasis added).) The
district court expressly stated that it read the entire presentence report prepared in
Ms. King's case, and it clearly indicated that it was using the information learned from

The State also asserts that Ms. Quintana's only opportunity to ensure a complete
record of right was during the objection to the record period established by I.A.R. 28,
and that because Ms. Quintana did not file the I.A.R. 30 motion to augment immediately
thereafter, the denial did not deprive her of due process. (See Resp. Br., pp.22-23.)
This argument is flawed in multiple respects. First, I.A.R. 30 has no limitations as to
when a motion must be filed. See generally I.A.R. 30. In fact, I.A.R. 30.1 (a) allows for
corrections to be made to the record "[a]t any time after the filing of a transcript or
record." I.A.R. 30.1 (a); see also I.A.R. 34(f) (allowing any party to file supplemental
authority at any time before the decision is made). This suggests ensuring that the
transcript, record, and decision on appeal are correct and complete is the primary goal
of the Rules. Second, regardless of whether Ms. Quintana or any other defendant opts
to use the process set forth in I.A.R. 28 or I.A.R. 30 to ensure a complete and correct
appellate record, the fact that the district court considered and relied upon a document
means that document needs to be augmented to the record; a failure to do so denies
the defendant the constitutional protections of due process. See, e.g., Smith v. State,
146 Idaho 822, 837-38 (2008). Because the district court explicitly considered all of
Ms. King's PSI, that whole document needs to be included in Ms. Quintana's appellate
record, or else she has not been provided with her constitutional due process. See id.
Finally, the State provides no authority to support its argument that Ms. Quintana's
rights were not violated because she opted not to use the procedures set forth in
I.C.R. 28, and as such, should not be considered. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263
(1996).
6
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that review as an aggravating factor against Ms. Quintana. 7 The Idaho Supreme Court
has held that "denial of access to the information which the district court utilizes in
making its decision deprives the offender of meaningful notice of that which he is
attempting to challenge and consequently, it deprives the offender of any meaningful
opportunity to be heard." Smith, 146 Idaho at 837-38.

Deprivation of a meaningful

opportunity to be heard violates the state and federal constitutional due process
protections. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); State v. Card, 121 Idaho
425, 445 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998);
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 542, 544 (Ct. App. 2009).

Additionally, the State is obligated to provide the indigent defendant with equal
protection by ensuring she has an appellate record "that is sufficient for adequate
appellate

review

of

the

errors

alleged

regarding

the

proceedings

below."

State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462 (2002). Because the document considered by the

district court is necessary for appeal based on due process principles (see Armstrong
and Card), the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court refused to augment the record with
that document in this case, where Ms. Quintana is an indigent defendant, demonstrates
a violation of her equal protection rights as well.

See Strand, 137 Idaho at 462. As

such, the decision to deny Ms. Quintana access to documents expressly considered by
the district court clearly violated her state and federal constitutional due process and
equal protection rights.

The fact that the district court used that information in aggravation and that she has
been denied the opportunity to review that information demonstrates the prejudice
caused to Ms. Quintana's appeal. See, e.g., Sheel v. Rinard, 91 Idaho 736,738 (1967).
7
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C.

The Outline Of Ms. King's PSI Reproduced In Ms. Quintana's PSI Is Insufficient
To Remedy The Violation Of Ms. Quintana's Constitutional Rights To Due
Process And Equal Protection
In

its

Respondent's

Brief,

the

State

quotes

several

paragraphs

from

Ms.Quintana's PSI, erroneously believing that those statements are sufficient to rectify
the violation of Ms. Quintana's constitutional rights. (See Resp. Br., pp.2D-22 (quoting
39156 PSI, pp.12-13).) The quoted material is part of the section from Ms. Quintana's
PSI where the

presentence investigator summarized the

Ms. Quintana has had.

(39156 PSI, pp.11-13.)

romantic relationships

The information the investigator

provided was "outlined in the Presentence Report prepared for the co-defendant,
Shauntel King."

(39156 PSI, p.12 (emphasis added).)

Additionally, it is not a full

presentation of the information considered by the district court, which was the entire PSI
prepared for Ms. King. (39156 Tr., p.4D, Ls.6-9.)
Ms. Quintana is entitled to access to the information considered by the district
court, not a mere outline of part of the information considered by the district court.

See Smith, 146 Idaho at 837-38.

"It would be ... a hazardous endeavor for [the

appellate court] to rule upon an appeal without access to all relevant material used in

the hearing below." Sheel, 91 Idaho at 738 (emphasis added). Therefore, while this
reproduced outline might provide some indication as to some of the information the
district court saw in Ms. King's PSI, the fact that the outline was reproduced does not
remedy the violation of Ms. Quintana's constitutional rights.

738; Smith, 146 Idaho at 837-38.
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See Sheel, 91 Idaho at

D.

Either Of Idaho's Appellate Courts Are Capable Of Providing Ms. Quintana With
A Remedy For The Violation Of Her Constitutional Rights
Having demonstrated the violation of Ms. Quintana's constitutional rights, the

only remaining question is as to the appropriate remedy.

The State focuses on the

ability of the Court of Appeals to remedy this situation first.

(Resp. Br., pp.17 -19.)

Of course, the Idaho Supreme Court could decide not to assign this case and rectify
its error itself. See I.A.R. 108. However, even if the case is assigned to the Court of
Appeals, the Court of Appeals could still afford a remedy to Ms. Quintana.
Ms. Quintana would not be asking the Court of Appeals to overrule the decision of the
Idaho Supreme Court made in regard to the motion to augment the record. Rather, she
is asserting that certain, now-final, decisions made during the appellate review process
deprived her of certain constitutional rights. (See App. Br., p.29 (focusing on the first
alternative relief request).)
In acknowledgment of the fact that those violations exist, Ms. Quintana would be
requesting that the Court of Appeals grant her some form of relief. For example, in light
of the deprivation of these rights, this Court could reverse the presumption set forth in
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999), in her case, and presume that the
non-augmented

PSI

supports her claims,

demonstrating

that the district court,

particularly in case number 39156, abused its discretion and imposed an excessive
sentence. It could also determine that because of the violations, Ms. Quintana's overall
sentence should be reduced. As such, either of Idaho's appellate courts is capable of
providing Ms. Quintana with a remedy for the violation of her constitutional rights.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Quintana respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentences as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, she respectfully requests that her cases, particularly
case number 39156, be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
Otherwise, she respectfully requests that counsel be provided with access to
Ms. King's PSI and that counsel be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary
supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2012.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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